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Abstract
Total fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are nearly double that of any other region
in the world. Evidence is mixed on whether providing contraceptives has an impact on
fertility. I exploit exogenous, intermittent reductions in contraceptive supply in Ghana,
resulting from cuts in U.S. funding, to examine impacts on pregnancy, abortion, and
births. Women are unable to fully compensate for the 22% supply reduction using
traditional methods for preventing pregnancy, which increases by 10%. Only non-poor
women offset these unwanted pregnancies with induced abortion. Using separate data,
I find that poor women experience increases in realized fertility of 7-10%.
JEL Codes: I15, J13, O19, F35
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1 Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest fertility rates in the world, lagging behind every other
region in terms of demographic transition. This region also has significant unmet need for
family planning, with fertility rates outpacing wanted fertility by 24%. Unwanted fertility
is highest among the poorest and least educated women, suggesting that achieving target
fertility has significant implications for the welfare and productivity of the next generation
of Africans.1 Such figures suggest that family planning programs may play a key role in
African development.
Yet whether or not contraceptive access actually affects fertility outcomes is a matter of
considerable debate. Some have argued that fertility is driven purely by preferences, and
that access to family planning has negligible impacts (Pritchett, 1994; Miller, 2010), while
others have provided evidence that increased access to contraceptives does reduce fertility
(Sinha, 2005; Molyneaux and Gertler, 2000).
In Sub-Saharan Africa, eighty percent of contraceptive supplies are provided by interna-
tional population assistance (Ross, Weissman, and Stover, 2009). Such funds are not always
reliable, as they are subject to the whims of donors, as in the case presented here. Further,
the debate continues regarding whether international aid on the whole should be dramat-
ically increased or should be scaled back, due to detrimental impacts and aid dependance
(See Easterly and Williamson 2011; Moyo 2009). For these reasons, and because poor coun-
tries struggle with how to allocate their own funds, it is useful to understand the potential
impacts (or lack thereof) of changes in funding for contraceptive provision.
If we assume that a woman has a desired fertility target, use of modern contraceptives
is only one way of achieving that target. Traditional methods may also prevent pregnancy.2
1Based on the most recent Demographic and Health Surveys surveys from 41 countries in this region,
average wanted fertility is 4.1 children per woman, whereas average realized fertility is 5.1 children per
woman. Excess fertility, defined as the difference between wanted and realized fertility, is 1.3 children for
the poorest (and for those with no education) and 0.6 children for the least poor (and those with secondary
or higher education)(MEASURE-DHS, 2013).
2Modern contraception includes hormonal methods (e.g. pill, implant, injection, IUD), barrier methods
(e.g. condom, diaphragm, sponge, spermicide), and permanent methods (i.e. sterilization). Traditional
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In some contexts, induced abortion can also be used to prevent unwanted births. It thus
remains an open question whether supply-side changes in contraceptive availability will di-
rectly translate into changes in fertility. A women may adjust her use of these other options
in order to compensate for insufficient supply, leaving fertility unchanged. Or, if women are
unable or unwilling to do so, fertility outcomes may respond to supply. Such behavioral
questions are interesting theoretically, but also have significant implications for designing
policies to achieve fertility transition and long-term development in Africa.
Equally interesting are questions regarding how such behavioral responses will differ de-
pending on different demographic characteristics. What factors affect the degree to which
a woman will engage in compensating behavior and thereby achieve her target regardless of
supply? Are educated women better at this? Are rural women less willing or able to do so?
Answers to these questions indicate which groups are most affected by supply-side factors
of contraception provision. For example, Pop-Eleches (2010) finds that a drastic increase in
the availability of modern contraceptives and abortion in Romania decreased fertility most
for the least educated women. To the degree that demographic factors matter for behavioral
response, a link may be drawn between contraceptive supply and the characteristics of re-
sulting fertility. This is the first study, to my knowledge, that examines the individual-level
behavioral response to broad-based, supply-side changes in contraceptives in the context of
Sub-Saharan Africa.3
This paper exploits exogenous reductions in rural contraceptive availability to examine
women’s behavioral responses in terms of fertility decisions and outcomes in the context of
Sub-Saharan Africa. The reductions resulted from significant cuts in U.S. funding to foreign
NGOs that provide contraceptives. Consistently, the U.S. is the largest provider of such
methods include abstinence, withdrawal, rhythm, lactational amenorrhea and other folkloric methods.
3It is noted that several US-based studies have examined the impacts of access to contraception on a
variety of outcomes (Bailey, 2006, 2010; Bailey, Hershbein, and Miller, 2012; Myers, 2012). Other studies
studies based in the US or Romania have examined the impact of access to abortion (Currie, Nixon, and Cole,
1996; Kane and Staiger, 1996; Cook, 1999; Gruber, Levine, and Staiger, 1999; Pop-Eleches, 2006; Ananat,
Gruber, and Levine, 2007; Mitrut and Wolff, 2011) or combined access to contraception and abortion (Guldi,
2008; Pop-Eleches, 2010).
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international population assistance (Ashford, 2010). Much of this assistance flows to NGOs,
who are primary providers of rural outreach for family planning in many poor countries
(Turnbull and Bogecho, 2003). The funding cuts were a result of domestic politics in the
U.S., discussed in detail in section 4, and were in place during the periods 1984-1992 and
2001-2008.
The context of the analysis is Ghana, based on the availability of individual-level data
on induced abortion, which is necessary for examining women’s decisions in the face of
supply changes. I first provide evidence that contraceptive availability was reduced during
policy periods and that rural contraceptive use was impacted as well. These findings are
consistent with reports that the primary impact of the budget cuts was to reduce outreach
for contraceptive provision in rural areas.
I then create a woman-by-month panel to examine the impact of these changes on in-
dividual fertility outcomes. Estimating within-woman, I find that conception significantly
increased during policy periods for rural but not urban women. These results are concen-
trated in regions that experienced the greatest policy-induced reductions in contraceptive
use. I also find an increase in the use of induced abortion in rural areas, but only for women
in the top three wealth quintiles. The poorest women were either unable or unwilling to
offset the increase in pregnancies with induced abortion. As a result these women experience
increases in fertility that did not occur among other groups.
The following section reviews the debate on the role of contraceptive access in reduc-
ing unwanted fertility. Section 3 sets up a conceptual framework that predicts differential
impacts across demographic groups. Section 4 gives background on the U.S. policy that
provides exogenous variation for this study, with a focus on the policy’s repercussions in
Ghana. Evidence of reductions in contraceptive availability and use are presented in Section
5. Section 6 examines impacts on conception and abortion, and section 7 examines changes
in resulting fertility. Section 8 discusses the results and their implications and concludes.
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2 Existing Evidence
Becker (1993) argues that the major changes in fertility have been caused by changes in
demand for children, rather than birth control methods. In agreement, Pritchett (1994)
claims that a precedent exists for fertility transition without modern contraception. He cites
crude birth rates in Europe around 1800 that were lower than the average rate in low-income
countries in 1990. However, the 1800 rates cited are far from replacement fertility, and are
in fact comparable are to rates in low-income countries today.4
In Romania and Ireland, fertility declined 30% following the legalization of contracep-
tives. However, abortion legalization in Romania, and changing social norms in Ireland were
contemporaneous with contraceptive legalization, making it difficult to assign causality (Pop-
Eleches, 2010; Bloom and Canning, 2003). More experimental evidence in the US suggests
that contraceptive subsidies reduce fertility by a significant, but small, 2% (Kearney and
Levine, 2009).
Experimental evidence on the impact of contraceptive access in low income countries
begins with the 1978 Family Planning and Health Services program in Matlab, Bangladesh.
Sinha (2005) estimates that women exposed to the program had lifetime fertility reduced by
14%. However, it is unclear how much of that impact is attributable to the family planning
aspects of the program, rather than the introduction of other health services (Phillips et al.,
1982). Smaller impacts are found in Colombia by Miller (2010), who estimates that the
expansion of a large, government family planning program reduced fertility by 6-7%. Grant
deems this a negligible change in total fertility. His view is consistent with Pritchett (1994),
who claims that contraceptive prevalence has a significant, but negligibly small effect on
realized fertility, as preferences account for 90% of differences across countries’ fertility rates.
In response, Bongaarts (1994) argues that reductions in fertility of 5-10% are not little, but
rather, they represent a meaningfully large share of unwanted fertility.
4Europe in 1800 averaged 30 births per 1,000 population (Pritchett, 1994). Low income countries in 1990
averaged 41. By 2011, low income countries’ average rate was 32; OECD countries average rate in was 12.2
(World Bank Development Indicators,2013).
6
Other works based on experiments or natural experiments have provided evidence on
both sides of the argument. Molyneaux and Gertler (2000) instrument for family planning
program placement in Indonesia and find that the reach of the supply network does have
a significant impact on fertility. On the other hand, McKelvey, Thomas, and Frankenberg
(2012) show that, in the same setting, exogenous variation in prices of contraceptives hardly
affects use. An experiment by Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2010) provides evidence that a woman
is more likely to use contraception and reduce unwanted births when the contraception is
concealable from her husband. Like Pritchett, they argue that preferences play a dominant
role in contraceptive use and thus provision of contraceptives is unlikely to change African
fertility as long as men have de facto control over its use.
3 Conceptual Framework
Consider a production function for fertility
F = f (T,M,A, ε)
where a woman’s realized fertility, F , is a function of her effort to prevent pregnancy by tradi-
tional methods, T (including abstinence, rhythm, coitus interruptus, lactational amenorrhea
and folkloric methods), her use of modern contraception, M , her use of induced abortion, A,
and an idiosyncratic term that includes both natural fecundity and random error, ε.5 T , M ,
and A have negative and unique relationships with F . There are monetary costs associated
with M and A, as well as time costs for acquiring them. Further, there are unique utility
costs associated with using T , M , and A (which may include partner negotiation). In opti-
mization, a woman will seek to minimize the difference between her realized fertility and her
exogenously given target fertility, F ∗, while minimizing the utility, monetary, and time costs
5In the SSA context, methods for increasing fecundity, such as in vitro fertilization, are not generally in
a woman’s set of options, and are thus excluded from this model.
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associated with preventing F from exceeding F ∗.6
This framework suggests that an increase in the monetary or time cost of M associated
with reduced supply will spur re-optimization. If she reduces her use of M , she may choose
to increase T and/or A in order to keep F as close to F ∗ as possible, depending on her utility
costs of T , A, and (F − F ∗), and the functional form of f . This offers several predictions in
terms of fertility outcomes.
Specifically, given an increase in the cost of M , we would expect to see increases in
pregnancy for women who meet both of the two criteria:
1. Reduce their use of M , because either
(a) she is unwilling/unable to forgo consumption to pay the increased price, due to
high marginal utility of consumption (i.e. poor women), or
(b) she is unwilling to commit additional time to acquiring M in the case of stock-outs,
due to high opportunity costs (i.e. educated women), and
2. Are unable to fully compensate by increasing T , because either
(a) her use of T is not effective for preventing pregnancy, due to low knowledge (i.e.
uneducated women), or
(b) her utility cost of using T is high (she or her husband may oppose abstinence/rhythm,
coitus interruptus, etc.)
We would expect to see increases in realized fertility for women who both:
1. Experience increased pregnancy, and
2. Do not fully offset additional pregnancies with A because either
6This characterization assumes that the woman has sufficient fecundity to meet or exceed her desired
fertility.
8
(a) she is unwilling/unable to reduce other consumption in order to purchase an
increased amount of A (i.e. poorer women), or
(b) she has a high utility cost of A, due to traditional values (i.e. uneducated women)
The predicted impacts on conception, abortion, and realized fertility by poverty and educa-
tion group are summarized in Table 1. For non-poor, educated women, we expect no change
in fertility as any possible change would be offset with abortion. For non-poor women with
low education, we expect no change in conception as they would be likely to continue using
M despite the increased monetary and time costs. For poor women with low education, we
expect an increase in conception and realized fertility, with no offsetting by induced abor-
tion. Finally, for the small group of women who are poor but educated, the predictions for
conception are ambiguous, though we can say that realized fertility will move as conception
does, as these women are also unlikely to offset with abortion.
4 Background on the Mexico City Policy
The United States is consistently one of the largest donors of international population assis-
tance worldwide.7 In 1984, President Reagan issued an executive order that restricted such
funding in the following way:
“[T]he United States does not consider abortion an acceptable element of family
planning programs and will no longer contribute to those of which it is a part.
... Moreover, the United States will no longer contribute to separate nongovern-
mental organizations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of
family planning in other nations.” [The White House Office of Policy
Development, 1984]
7UNFPA (2004). Population assistance is defined as funding to support the provision of contraception
and family planning in foreign nations.
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This executive order is known as the Mexico City policy, based on its introduction at the
International Conference on Population held in Mexico City in 1984. It requires foreign
NGOs to sign official affidavits stating that they will not perform, lobby for, or educate clients
about safe abortion. If they refuse, they forfeit any and all population assistance provided by
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).8 Organizations unwilling
to sign affidavits were those for which reproductive health and family planning were the
foremost objective. Often, these organizations were not performing abortion (as it is illegal
in many poor countries), but were providing a considerable share of contraceptive supply.
Such groups lost all funding from USAID, amounting to 10-60% of organizational budgets.
This included large, international organizations such as International Planned Parenthood
Federation (IPPF) and Marie Stopes International (MSI), as well as small local NGOs such
as Family Guidance Association of Ethiopia and Family Planning Association of Kenya
(Turnbull and Bogecho, 2003).
Funding shortfalls resulting from lost USAID funds took effect in early 1985. The policy
remained in effect until it was repealed by President Clinton in January, 1993. It was
reinstated by President Bush in January, 2001.9 Despite many Congressional votes on the
matter, the policy remained in effect until it was rescinded by President Obama in January,
2009.10 In the interim period 1993-2000, when the Mexico City Policy was not in effect, the
U.S. provided nearly 40% of population assistance worldwide (UNFPA, 2004). On average,
about half of that funding flowed to non-governmental organizations (PAI, 1999).
8At the time of the policy’s creation, and still today, abortion on-request is not legal in many countries
that receive US population assistance. Further, the 1973 Helms Amendment already forbade the use of
U.S. monies for that purpose. Therefore, it was the forbidding of organizations to use their own funds to
educate women about safe abortion options or lobby the government for legalization that earned the policy
the derisive nickname “the global gag rule.”
9The policy was extended to apply to State Department funds as well in August, 2003.
10For Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, their change to the policy’s effectiveness was issued on the
first or second day following inauguration. It has been the concern of several major court battles, one of
which ended in the Supreme Court; and at least twenty congressional debates or votes have been taken on
the matter (see Appendix Table A.2). It’s potential reinstatement in 2011 was one of the “policy riders” that
created a roadblock in the Congressional budget negotiations, nearly shutting down the federal government.
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Advocacy groups consistently report that the primary impact of the policy was to force
cutbacks in rural outreach services, reducing access to contraceptives in rural areas. A
recent evaluation of the policy by Bendavid, Avila, and Miller (2011) examined its impact
on abortion use. They employ cross-country data and an algorithm to infer abortions and
conclude that women in high-exposure countries increased their use of abortion following the
2001 reimplementation of the policy.11
Repercussions of the policy in Ghana
Information regarding NGO funding prior to the 1984 implementation of the Mexico City
policy is not readily available. However, the situation surrounding the re-imposition of the
policy in 2001 provides some insight regarding the policy’s effect. USAID documents from
late 1999 list funds slated to specific NGOs, by country, for the 2001 fiscal year. The total
per country slated to foreign-based reproductive health NGOs represents the funds at risk for
loss following the 2001 re-imposition of the policy (see Appendix Table A.1). In Ghana, such
organizations were slated to receive nearly $800,000 in FY2001. That is approximately the
median for countries receiving such funding, suggesting that Ghana is a fairly representative
case (USAID, 1999).
Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana (PPAG) was (and is) the leading NGO-
provider of reproductive and sexual health services in Ghana. As of late 1999, PPAG was
slated to receive $472,952 from USAID in 2001 (USAID, 1999).12 Upon the executive or-
der in January 2001, these funds would only be disbursed if the organization agreed to the
Mexico City policy.
11My findings are consistent with theirs, though my methodology differs in a number of ways: (i) I focus
on one country, rather than many, which allows me to employ data on actual induced abortions, rather than
estimating abortions via algorithm; (ii) I estimate within-woman rather than across countries; (iii) I estimate
a more comprehensive effect of the policy, including the first 3 changes in the policy, rather than just the
2001 reimplementation; (iv) I show evidence that the pathway of the effect on abortion is indeed increased
conception; and (v) I investigate the impact on fertility outcomes more broadly, including conception rates
and fertility rates.
12The remainder of at-risk USAID funds slated for NGOs in Ghana were for Ghana Social Marketing
Foundation, which also primarily provides contraceptives.
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Under normal circumstances, the majority of funding for PPAG comes from the Interna-
tional Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). However, at this time, USAID was funding a
large Community-Based Services (CBS) project through PPAG. As such, USAID was slated
to provide 1/4 of PPAG’s budget for FY2001. The CBS project was scheduled to run through
2003 and in order to preserve this project, PPAG agreed to the MCP to keep its USAID
funding (Turnbull and Bogecho, 2003; IPPF, 2002).
However, from 2001 to 2003 PPAG did experience significant budget losses, as its funding
from IPPF was reduced by 54% (reducing the total budget by 40%) (IPPF, 2002). As IPPF
had refused to sign the policy, it had experienced budget cuts. Out of necessity, these were
passed on to its member organizations.13 In 2003, at the conclusion of the CBS project,
PPAG rejected the policy and lost USAID funding (and in-kind donations of contraceptives)
in addition to previous budget cuts from IPPF. Funding from IPPF did not fully recover
until after the repeal in 2009 (see Appendix Table A.3). Many PPAG clinics were closed or
consolidated during this period, especially those in rural areas, as shown in the before-and-
after location maps in Figure 1.
Advocacy groups have claimed that the funding losses resulting from this policy pri-
marily impacted the availability of contraceptives to poor, rural populations, rather than
the provision of abortion services (Cincotta and Crane, 2001; Crane and Dusenberry, 2004).
In particular, a report states that in Ghana, “the major cutbacks in PPAG staff and the
loss of its community-based distributors have limited its outreach capabilities, particularly
in the most remote areas of Ghana” (Turnbull and Bogecho, 2003). Such claims are sup-
ported by information received directly from PPAG, which shows that contraceptive provision
via community-based distribution in rural areas, as measured in couple-years of protection,
dropped by 45% as a result of funding losses (PPAG, 2012). While provision of post-abortion
13Prior to the 2001 re-imposition of the Mexico City policy, USAID was providing 7.3% of income for
IPPF (IPPF, 2002). It’s not clear why cuts to PPAG were so large relative to IPPF losses. Perhaps IPPF’s
funding cuts to member organizations were inversely proportional to the unilateral budget cuts suffered by
the member.
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care increased, no indication was given that availability of abortion services was impacted.14
5 Changes in Contraceptive Availability and Use
Surveys of government, private, and NGO providers of family planning services in Ghana
were undertaken in 1993, 1996 and 2002.15 A comprehensive report based on these surveys
suggests that contraceptive availability was lower during the years the policy was in effect,
as shown in Table 2 (Hong et al., 2005). The availability of contraceptive methods (weakly)
increased for five out of six methods when the policy was rescinded (in 1996 vs. 1993), and
decreased for five out of six methods after reinstatement (in 2002 vs. 1996). Surrounding
the reinstatement, the magnitudes of decreases in availability range from 7% to 19% across
contraceptive methods (13% on average).
Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) regularly collect information on repro-
duction and health for a nationally representative, cross-sectional sample of women aged
15-49 (GSS, GHS, and ICF, 2009). Data from the 1998 DHS indicate that, of women having
ever used contraception, 58% were rural and 44% were acquiring them from private providers
such as PPAG. Given a national reduction of 13%, these suggest that reductions in rural
provision by private providers was on the order of 50%, as reported by PPAG, and total
rural provision was reduced by 22%.
To better examine heterogeneities across regions, I estimate changes in contraceptive use,
as a proxy for changes in availability.16 The data available for this exercise come from the
DHS, in which contraceptive use is reported only as current use at the time of the interview,
14Abortion has been legal in Ghana, with significant restrictions, since 1985. Since a change in the legal
status of abortion coincided with one of the policy changes of interest, estimates of the policy’s impact on
abortion use were also run excluding the 1985 policy change. These results do not differ from the results
presented here, and are available upon request.
15In 1993 and 1996 by the Population Council’s Africa Operations Research and Technical Assistance
Project. In 2002 by Macro International as part of the MEASURE DHS+ project.
16The data used by Hong, et al. are no longer available, so no further analysis of changes in availability
over time can be undertaken. The 2002 Demographic and Health Survey Service Provision Assessment by
MACRO is available but cannot be used to see changes over time. The data from the Situation Analysis
Studies in 1993 and 1996 are no longer available; they were corrupted while being stored on floppy disks
(Arnold, 2013).
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and whether the respondent has ever used.17 While DHS data are available from 1988, 1993,
1998, 2003 and 2008, five data points are hardly sufficient to estimate the impact of the
policy in a region.
A useful stylized fact is that, while many Ghanaian women never use modern contra-
ception, the ones that ever do generally begin using it after the first birth. This is evident
in the data on 24,500 women from the five surveys described above. Fig. 3 shows ever-use
rates by parity for women in each of the five surveys. Among women in the three most
recent surveys, there is a steep increase in ever-use following the first birth, while increases
following subsequent births are negligible. Specifically, only 23% of nulliparous women were
ever-users, this nearly doubles among uniparous women (42%) and the maximum ever-use
rate among multiparous women is only slightly higher (46% at parity 4). The pattern is
consistent but somewhat muted in the two earlier surveys (a doubling followed by a 30%
increase).
I take advantage of this fact to use the timing of the first birth as an indicator for exposure
to the policy in terms of contraceptive use. That is, I estimate whether a woman has ever
used contraception at the time of her interview as a function of whether the policy was in
place at the time of her first birth. I estimate the linear probability model
CPTiy = α0 + α1ON
FB
iy +X
′
iyφ+M
′
iyθ + νy + εiy (1)
where CPTiy indicates that woman i has ever used modern contraception at the time of her
interview in year y; ONFBiy indicates that the policy was in effect at the time of the first
birth to woman i (from survey y); Miy is a quadratic time trend (for the birth timing); and
νy is a survey fixed effect. Xiy contains characteristics of woman i in year y, such as age,
parity, ever-married status, poverty (defined as two poorest wealth quintiles specific the rural
or urban sector), and low education (primary school or less). This is estimated for the full
17Although some DHS surveys include contraceptive calendars for the 5 years prior to the interview, none
of those in Ghana include this module. The author is not aware of any other data that include information
on contraceptive use in Ghana.
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sample, for rural and urban sectors, and for each region individually.
Since the only outcome available is “ever-use,” estimates of α1 will be underestimates of
the policy’s impact on contemporaneous contraceptive use. While contraceptive use may
have been prevented by exposure to the policy at first birth, some women may have begun
use after the removal of the policy but before the survey, depending on the timing. This
would result in an affirmative answer for ever-use at the time of the survey, even for women
whose contraceptive use was prevented during the policy. Thus, the estimates for reductions
in contraception are primarily useful for the assessing regional heterogeneities, and should
be interpreted cardinally only as an extreme lower bound.
Table 3 provides evidence that exposure to the policy at the time of first birth reduces
the probability of having ever used contraception at the time of the interview. Overall,
exposure reduces ever-use by 2 percentage points, about a 5% impact. However, the impact is
concentrated among rural populations, where the impact is 7% to 8%. This is consistent with
reports that contraceptive access in rural areas depends on the outreach services provided
by groups such as PPAG. It is also consistent with PPAG’s own report that funding cuts
translated directly into the loss of rural distribution of contraceptives (Nerquaye-Tetteh,
2012).
The exclusion of woman characteristics, the time trend of the year of first birth, or the
survey fixed effect do not measurably change the point estimate, which ranges from −.023
to −.028. In the two final columns, I check for differences according to a woman’s wealth or
education. In both cases I find that effects are not statistically different across groups; the
point estimates indicate effect sizes of about 6% for the poor and uneducated and 8% for
others.
In addition to differences across rural and urban sectors, I also examine heterogeneities
across the ten administrative regions of Ghana. I estimate the equivalent of column 3 from
Table 3 separately for each region, as shown in Table 4. With samples sizes ranging from 200
to 1150, only two regions have estimates that are statistically different from zero. These are
15
Volta and Ashanti, both of which experienced reductions in contraception ever-use greater
than 15%, and are classified as high-impact regions. Western, Central, Brong-Ahafo, Upper
East and Upper West all have point estimates suggesting reductions in contraception ever-
use between 5% and 10%, and are categorized as medium-impact. Finally, three regions have
positive point estimates and are classified as low-impact; these are Greater Accra, a densely
populated urban area, its neighboring region, Eastern, and the Northern region, which has
extremely low ever-use rates (12.5%; the next lowest region has more than double this rate).
These categorizations will serve to examine differential impacts by policy intensity in the
following section.
6 Impact on Conception and Abortion
6.1 Data
The data used in the preceding section are from standard DHS surveys collected every five
years in many developing countries by Macro International’s MEASURE project. In 2007,
MEASURE conducted a non-standard DHS survey in Ghana composed of special modules
on maternal mortality and abortion (GSS, GHS, and Macro, 2009). Unlike most DHS,
which collect a woman’s complete birth history, this survey queried each woman’s complete
pregnancy history, including pregnancies that ended in miscarriages, stillbirths and induced
abortions. While a handful of other DHS also collect pregnancy (rather than birth) histories,
the Ghana 2007 survey is the only one that explicitly records the use of induced abortion.18
These data will be useful for determining if the supply changes resulting from the policy
impacted pregnancy and abortion use at the individual level.
The data contain information for 10,370 women. For each pregnancy in a woman’s
lifetime, the following information is recorded: the duration of the pregnancy, the month
18Further, other surveys conducted after 2001 that include pregnancy histories are in countries unlikely to
be as affected by the Mexico City policy: Armenia 2005, Azerbaijan 2006, Moldova 2005, Philippines 2008,
and Ukraine 2007.
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and year it ended (from which one can roughly deduce the month it began), how it ended,
and further information about the child if it was a live birth. Using this, I create a woman-
by-month panel. In each month, a woman has one of the following seven statuses: conceived,
is pregnant, birthed a live child, had a stillbirth, miscarried, aborted a pregnancy, or was not
pregnant. Moving consecutively through the months, summing the live births, I calculate her
existing parity (number of children previously born) in each month. The survey also collects
information regarding the woman’s date of birth and month and year of first marriage (or
cohabiting union). Using these, each woman-month observation is assigned the woman’s age
and parity and whether or not she has ever been in union at that time. Months in which
the woman is at least 15 years of age compose the complete data set. There are 1.8 million
observations from 1981 to 2007. Each woman has between 1 and 323 observations (mean is
144; only 5% of women have fewer than 10 observations).
Other information collected about the woman does not vary over time, but is useful for
dividing women into demographic subgroups. A wealth index for her household is created
based on a principle components analysis of information about housing quality, drinking
water source, toilet facilities and durable assets (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). From this,
women are classified by wealth quintiles, specific to rural and urban sectors. While wealth
may vary throughout a woman’s life, it seems that wealth quintile is likely somewhat stable.
Additionally, the data include educational attainment. This too is measured at the time of
the survey only, so I classify women according to whether or not they had any schooling
beyond primary school (grade 6), an indicator that is likely unchanging by age 15.
Balancing the panel A primary concern in creation of panel data from cross-sectional
data is the loss of representativeness. The survey is nationally representative of women aged
15 to 49 in 2007 (mean age is 29). For each woman, her panel begins when she turns 15 (or
in 1981 if she is already 15 or older) and ends when she is interviewed in 2007 (max age is
49). However, the resulting panel is not representative of women of these ages for each year.
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For example, in 1981, the data only contain women aged 15 to 24 (mean 18); in 1997 they
contain women aged 15 to 40 (mean 25). This “aging” of the sample confounds comparisons
of births from different time periods. In order to limit the bias arising from the conversion of
cross-sectional to panel data, I limit the age range of women in the sample. This effectively
creates a “rolling panel” where women age into and out of the sample over time. But what
is the appropriate age range for this analysis?
Figure 2.A shows the conception rate by age; that is, the share of fecund woman-months
in which a conception occurred. The conception rates are highest (over 2.5%) for women
aged 22 to 27. A gradual decline begins around age 28, becoming steeper at age 37. For
women younger than age 17, or aged 40+, the chance of conception in a given month is
less than 1%. Figure 2.B shows the abortion rate by age; that is, the share of pregnancy
conclusions that are abortions. The likelihood of aborting a pregnancy is greatest for the
youngest women; over 15% for 15 year olds. However, considering their low number of
pregnancies, this represents a small share of total procedures. The likelihood of aborting a
pregnancy declines with age, generally remaining below 5% for women over age 25. Figure
2.C shows the confluence of likelihood of conception and likelihood of aborting an existing
pregnancy, that is, the probability of having an abortion, by age. The combination of high
conception rates and high abortion rates yield the greatest chance of having an abortion for
women aged 18 to 20: about 2% per year (.0018*12). Women outside the 17 to 25 age range
have a considerably lower probability: less than 1% per year.
Given the focus of the analysis on conception and abortion decisions, I select the 17 to 25
age range as the default for the analysis, varying this in robustness checks. In order to keep
the sample consistent, I employ data only from months in which the sample is representative
of this age range (1981 to 2007).19 These data are divided according to policy periods:“PRE”
from 1981 to 1984, “ON 1” from 1985 to 1992, “OFF” from 1993 to 2000, and “ON 2” from
2001 onward. Appendix Table A.4 shows how the mean age for the full sample is significantly
19While the respondents report pregnancies as far back as 1977, the panel used for this analysis begins in
1981, for reasons of representativeness as discussed.
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increasing over the periods. The last two columns show that when restricting observations
to those for women aged 17 to 25, the mean age is much more similar across periods. Further
restricting to the group in which most abortions occur (18 to 20 year olds) produces mean
ages nearly identical across periods.
There are 8,334 women that are observed while aged 17 to 25. The conception analysis
includes all of these women, in each month when she is in this age range. Of the 7,489 women
that are ever-pregnant in the sample, 91% had a pregnancy while aged 17 to 25, yielding an
effective sample size for the abortion analysis of 6,818 women.20 However, it is useful to note
that, when employing woman-fixed effects, the identification of policy effects on abortion use
arises from women who have at least two pregnancies in that age range, with variation across
the pregnancies in the status of the policy. 68% of the effective sample have at least two
pregnancies during the nine year period when aged 17 to 25.21 This potentially introduces
some selection bias, so it is important to note that the estimated effects are specific to women
having two or more conceptions during that period of life. The source of identification is
further reduced by the fact that only 50% of these women have at least one pregnancy during
a policy period and at least one during a non-policy period. However, while this reduces the
size of the sample used for identification, it does not introduce any further bias. For each
woman, the timing of this nine-year period in her life is orthogonal to the imposition and
removal of the policy. Appendix Table A.5 shows the effective sample sizes for the analysis
of conception and abortion use.
Measurement error One concern regarding these data is noisy measurement of preg-
nancy timing due to recall error. One expects that reporting accurate dates for pregnancy
conclusions is more difficult for events further in the past. Less recent pregnancies will there-
fore have a higher probability of incorrect reporting of the month of the conclusion; in some
cases even the year of conclusion may be incorrect. While the selection of respondents that
20This figure is 93% for the rural sample.
2172% in the rural sample.
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misreport may be non-random, we expect that the direction of mis-reporting (too early or
too late) will be random. As such, the direction of mis-classification of pregnancies (regard-
ing whether they were conceived under the policy or not) will also be random. Therefore,
this introduces classical measurement error, which will attenuate the estimates toward zero.
Another artifact of recall error is that less recent pregnancies are more likely to be un-
reported due to forgetting, especially if the pregnancy ended in miscarriage, stillbirth or
abortion. Therefore, I include a fixed effect for the policy change nearest in time to the
month of observation. In this way, observations are directly compared only with others
within the same eight-year time span, so that misreporting should be more consistent within
these groups. However, even estimating within-period, this recall bias may still yield an
artificially lower rate of conception or abortion in earlier years. For periods surrounding a
policy change from on-to-off (off-to-on), this could artificially associate the policy with lower
(higher) conception and abortion rates. For this reason, it is important that the analysis
here includes both an on-to-off period, as well as off-to-on periods. As a robustness check,
I restrict the analysis to just one of each type of period and the results are not significantly
different.
Summary statistics Table 5 presents summary statistics regarding conception and abor-
tion rates for various demographic sub-samples. In addition to disaggregation by rural/urban
status, the rural population is divided into wealth and education groups. The two lowest
rural wealth quintiles are labeled “poorest.” It is notable that 70% of those in the top three
rural quintiles are still poor by international standards (less than $2/day), and so this group
is labeled “less poor.” The population is also divided into those with any schooling beyond
primary school (“high education,” 39%), and those without (“low education,” 61%).
Overall, for women aged 17 to 25, the probability of conception in a given month is .022.
This differs significantly between rural and urban populations (.025 vs. 018), but differs less
between the rural sub-groups shown. However, interesting differences across rural sub-groups
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exist in use of both contraception and abortion. While 47% of rural women have ever used
modern contraception, this figure is 28% for the uneducated poor and 62% for the educated
less-poor. Across all rural women, 4.8% of pregnancies are aborted. However, the uneducated
have rates of 1.6% and 3.7%, depending on wealth, whereas the educated use abortion at a
much higher rates (7% and 9.7%). On the whole, poorer and less educated women are less
likely to have ever used modern contraception and are less likely to end unwanted pregnancy
with abortion as compared to other rural women.22
6.2 Estimation
In estimating the impact of changes in contraceptive supply on conception and abortion,
one concern is the degree to which conception and abortion are affected by environmental
and situational concerns beyond the change in supply. For example, birth rates fluctuate in
tandem with business cycles, as couples are more reluctant to have children during recessions
(Kirk and Thomas, 1960). Fertility decisions are also affected by seasonal changes. For this
reason, it is important to control for other, unobservable factors changing over time. To deal
with seasonality, I include calendar month fixed effects. However, because the imposition (or
removal) of the policy always coincided with the change in calendar year, year fixed effects
would be perfectly collinear with an indicator for the policy. I employ several alternatives
to deal with this concern. First, I include a cubic time trend in all specifications. Second, I
focus the estimation on a fixed time window on either side of each policy change to reduce
the impact of time-varying unobservables. The default window includes observations within
four years of a policy change, and this is narrowed in robustness checks. Third, I include a
fixed-effect for the policy change that is nearest in time, effectively estimating within-change.
For example, an observation occurring in January 1990 is nearer the 1993 policy change than
22These statistics may also reflect a differential willingness to report abortion. If poorer or less educated
women perceive a greater stigma associated with abortion, they may be less willing to report in general.
Lower levels of reporting would act similarly to low levels of use, in that it makes any effect of the policy
more difficult to detect. Note, however, that this does not bias the results given the inclusion of woman-fixed
effects.
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the 1985 policy change. In this way, I compare observations just before a change to those
just after it, rather than comparing observations from, say, 1982, to those from 2004.
Finally, in order to control for the host of unobservable characteristics about each woman
that certainly affect such decisions, I employ woman-fixed effects to compare each woman
only with herself. Further, because a woman’s preference for having a child changes through-
out her life, I include controls for time-varying characteristics that strongly predict conception
and childbirth: quadratic functions of her age and parity (previous number of births), and
whether she has ever lived in union with a man.23
The primary estimations are
Cimyc = β0 + β1ONmy +X
′
imyφ+M
′
myθ + νi + νm + νc + εimyc (2)
Aimyc = γ0 + γ1ONmy +X
′
imyφ+M
′
myθ + νi + νm + νc + εimyc (3)
where Cimyc indicates that woman i conceived in month m of year y. The index c takes the
value 1, 2, or 3, representing which policy change is within the fewest months of my. Specif-
ically, c = 1 represents the change in late 1984 from PRE to ON1, including observations
in the window from 1981 through 1988. c = 2 represents the change in January 1993 from
ON1 to OFF, including observations from 1989 through 1996. c = 3 represents the change
in January 2001 from OFF to ON2, including observations from 1997 through 2004. Ximy is
a vector containing quadratic functions of age and parity specific to woman and month, plus
an indicator for whether she has ever been in a cohabiting union. M represents a cubic time
trend. Fixed effects for the individual, the calendar month, and the nearest policy change
are included as νi, νm, and νc, respectively. Aimyc = 1 indicates that the pregnancy of woman
i that ended in month m in year y was aborted. Aimyc = 0 for all pregnancies ending in
23Note that having ever been in union will be equal to zero for a woman in all months preceding her first
union and will be equal to one in all months following that. Note also that the results do not depend on the
inclusion of these controls, as show in section 6.3.
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live birth, stillbirth, or miscarriage. For the estimation of equation 3, all woman-months are
included when the woman is concluding a pregnancy while aged 17 to 25.
The independent regressor of interest is ONmy, which indicates that the policy was in
effect in month-year my. β1 and γ1 indicate the estimated impacts of the policy on conception
and abortion, respectively, of the sub-group for which Eq. 2, or 3, is estimated, conditional
on age, existing parity, ever-unioned status, and the secular trend.
6.3 Results
Conception
Table 6 provides estimates of the policy’s effect on the probability of conception for women
aged 17 to 25.24 Overall, the probability of conception per month increased by 0.0011, repre-
senting a 5.6% increase that is significant at the 5% level. Results for the urban population
are not significantly different from zero, consistent with the findings on contraceptive use
in section 5. This reflects the fact that contraceptives are more broadly available in urban
areas, so that changes in NGO provision are less salient.25 For the rural sample, however,
the probability of conception per month in rural areas increased by 0.0022 when the policy
was in place. This represents a 10% increase in pregnancies and is statistically different from
zero with 99% confidence. Recall that the estimated change in ever-use of contraceptives as
a result of the policy was 7% for rural areas, which serves as a lower bound for the effect on
contemporaneous use. Thus, it seems feasible that the true change in contemporaneous use
could result in a 10% increase in pregnancy.
The conceptual framework laid out in section 3 suggests that, even within the rural sector,
we may observe differences in these impacts across wealth and education groups. Columns
4 - 7 of Table 6 explore these differences. Cols. 4 and 5 estimate using only the Poorest two
24None of the estimates of the policy’s impact on conception is different when restricting the sample to
months when a woman is not already pregnant or concluding a pregnancy. Results available upon request.
25Four urban sub-groups are explored and none shows significant changes in conception as a result of the
policy (results not shown).
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quintiles, where Col. 5 adds an interaction term to examine the differential impact of the
policy according to education. Cols. 6 and 7 are parallel estimations using the Less Poor
sub-sample. The linear combination effects for the educated groups are reported below the
estimated coefficients.
I find that conception increased by 10% for women with low education, regardless of
wealth. This was expected for the uneducated poor, confirming that they are both unable
to pay the increased cost of contraception and unable to effectively prevent pregnancy with
traditional methods. However, this is surprising for the uneducated less-poor and suggests
that the assumption that the less-poor would absorb the price increase was incorrect. For
women with more education, there was no clear prediction for changes in conception. I find
that conception increased 11% for the educated less-poor; this would provide support for
the assumption that stock-outs increased the time required for accessing supply, which is
a greater opportunity cost for educated women. However, given that the monetary price
increase acted as a barrier for less-poor women too, I cannot determine whether the time
cost is also a barrier or not. Conception increases by these women also imply that either i)
these couples have high utility costs for using traditional methods, or ii) traditional methods
are not effective at preventing pregnancy, even for educated women.26 For the educated
poor, I cannot reject that the impact on conception was zero, and this is not consistent with
the model’s predictions. Drawing conclusions from this comes with the caveat that this is
a small and highly selected group of individuals (8% of rural population). Nonetheless, this
may suggest that effective use of traditional methods takes both education and practice, the
latter being something poor women are more likely to have than their richer counterparts.
In total, the 10-11% increase in conception estimated for 92% of the rural population
is fairly consistent with the evidence in section 5, which indicates significant reductions in
26Unfortunately, there are no data, to my knowledge, that track individuals’ use of traditional or modern
contraceptive methods over a time period relevant to these policy changes. Standard DHS surveys query
only current and ever use of each method. The only Ghana DHS with a full calendar of contraceptive use
was in 2008; however, the calendar covers the preceding five years during which time there were no changes
in the policy.
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contraceptive use that are not noticeably different across rural demographic groups.
Induced abortion
Table 7 shows the estimates of the policy’s impact on the share of pregnancies ending in
abortion for the full sample and the same subgroups.27 For the full sample, the coefficient is
positive, though not statistically different from zero at a standard level. The point estimate
for the urban population is also positive and imprecise, and we cannot reject that the effect
in urban areas is zero.
In rural areas, the estimation suggests that the policy increased the use of abortion by
2.35 percentage points, an estimate significant at the 5% level. Given that only 4.7% of
pregnancies are aborted in rural areas, this change reflects a 50% increase in the use of
abortion. However, this additional 2.35% of pregnancies aborted only partially offsets the
estimated 10% increase in pregnancies estimated by equation 2. That is, of the additional
unwanted pregnancies resulting from the policy, 1 in 5 were aborted.
The last four columns of Table 7 present results for rural sub-groups. For the poorest
two quintiles of the rural population, shown in Cols. 4 and 5, the effect is not distinguishable
from zero, regardless of education status. This is consistent with the prediction that abortion
is prohibitively costly for the poorest of the poor. For the Less Poor population, the policy
increases the share of pregnancies aborted by 3 to 4 percentage points. For the uneducated,
the estimate is significant at the 1% level; for the educated the point estimate is marginally
significant (p-value = .115). For the Less Poor, the increase in abortion offsets 30-40% of
conceptions that result from the supply reduction. The fact that education status has no
discernible effect on the policy’s impact on abortion use implies that the assumption that
uneducated women would hold traditional values preventing them from increasing use is
27What may also be of interest is the unconditional change in occurrence of abortion, that is the probability
of having an abortion in any month, regardless of pregnancy status. For the rural population, this probability
is only .0009, which makes changes in this low rate very difficult to detect. Nonetheless, I find that the policy
increased the unconditional probability of abortion for rural women by .0003, a 33% increase with a p-value
of .117. These results are shown by rural sub-group in Appendix Table A.6.
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false. Though education is generally a stronger predictor of abortion use than is wealth
(see Table 5), using abortion to compensate for reductions in contraception is not driven by
educational attainment. The results on conception and abortion by demographic sub-group
are summarized in Table 8.
Results by Regional Policy Intensity
To provide suggestive evidence that contraceptive use is the pathway by which the policy
impacted pregnancy and abortion rates, I estimate the policy’s impact separately by intensity
of impact in one’s region. I replicate column 3 of Table 6 (Eq. 2 using the full rural sample),
and column 6 of Table 7 (Eq. 3 using the rural, less poor sample). To each of these I
add interactions between the policy and indicators for medium and low impact regions, as
estimated in section 5.
I do find that the increases in pregnancy and abortion increase monotonically with the
intensity of policy impact on contraceptive use. In Table 11, the main effect (“policy”)
represents the impact in (high) regions where the policy induced the greatest reductions
in contraceptive use. These regions experienced a 14% increase in pregnancy. The linear
combinations of the main coefficient with the subsequent interaction terms are shown in the
second panel. These suggest that medium impact regions experienced pregnancy increases of
12%, significant at the 5% level; the impact for low impact regions is not distinguishable from
zero. Similarly, the point estimate for change in share of pregnancies aborted is .05 in high
impact regions, .04 in medium impact regions, and .03 in low impact regions, all statistically
different from zero at the 5% level. Though the estimates are generally not statistically
distinguishable from each other, the difference between increases in pregnancy between high
and low regions is nearly significant (p=0.101). This provides suggestive evidence that, in
regions where the policy had the greatest impact on contraceptive use, it also had the greatest
impact on conceptions and abortions.
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Specification & Placebo Tests
Varying estimation window In the specifications presented above, I include all years
within four years of a policy change (which includes all years 1981 through 2004). However,
one might expect that the effect of a policy (or its removal) would be most salient within
a narrower time frame. Table 9 shows the estimation of policy impacts on conception and
abortion for rural women using successively tighter windows of estimation. The estimates for
abortion use are focused on women in the upper three quintiles of wealth, as the poorest of
the poor showed no significant effect. I gradually narrow the window by six months at a time
(42 months, 36 months, 30 months, 24 months). The smallest feasible window that allows
enough women to have at least two pregnancies, and thereby allows the use of woman-fixed
effects, employs dates within 24 months of a policy change. The estimates show that as the
window is narrowed, the effect becomes gradually larger for estimates of abortion use. For
conception, estimates remain in the neighborhood of the original estimate of .0022.28
Robustness checks During the period of this analysis, there were other policies chang-
ing in Ghana that may have affected fertility decisions. In particular, in 2003 the government
introduced a national health insurance scheme (NHIS) that made all prenatal and maternity
care available free of charge. To check whether this policy is affecting the results presented
here, I include an indicator for the presence of the NHIS in the specification shown in columns
1 and 8 of Table 10. Its inclusion does not affect the point estimate in magnitude or precision
for either conception or abortion.
Another potential concern is that women are both more likely to conceive and more likely
to abort as they age through the 17 to 25 years-of-age period. Therefore a policy change
from off to on, viewed in isolation, will mechanically indicate that the policy increased both
conception and abortion. Since the primary estimates presented here include two changes of
this nature, and only one of the opposite nature, one may be concerned about this mechanical
28For conception estimations employing only months when a woman is not already pregnant or concluding
a pregnancy, the coefficients do increase as the window is narrowed. Results not shown.
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bias. Therefore, I restrict the estimation sample to the time windows surrounding just the
first two policy changes, so that the sample is balanced in terms of direction of policy change.
Columns 2 and 9 show the estimation including only the years surrounding the changes in
1985 and 1993 and the estimated effects are not significantly different than the original
estimates.
In section 6.1, I discuss the need to restrict the age range of women in included obser-
vations. The default age range is 17 to 25, based on the natural breaks in abortion use on
either side of this range. Columns 3 (and 4) and 10 (and 11) of Table 10 present results
under the larger age range of 16 to 26 (and 15 to 27). None of these differs significantly from
the primary estimation. Finally, columns 5 and 12 present the estimation without employing
the sampling weights and columns 6 and 13 estimate without the woman-level controls for
age, parity, and marital status; the estimates are not significantly different from the original
point estimates and remain statistically significant.
Placebo test Perhaps there is something about U.S. presidential elections that affects
fertility outcomes in Ghana by some mechanism outside the Mexico City Policy. Perhaps
elections affect business cycles in the U.S., which affect economies elsewhere. Or perhaps
there are expectations in the months approaching an election regarding what might change
about the policy. In order to test for these possibilities, I take advantage of the 1988 U.S.
presidential change-over (from Reagan to G.H. Bush) that did not change the policy in any
way. I estimate the effect of the 1988 election on conception and the use of abortion and find
effects that are not statistically distinguishable from zero (columns 7 and 14 of Table 10).
7 Net Impact on Fertility
The total fertility rate (TFR) of a population in a given year is the average number of live
births a woman would have in her lifetime if she were to experience the given year’s age-
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specific fertility rates (ASFR) for each age throughout her lifetime.29 This is the summation
of the single-age ASFRs in the given year. In order to calculate the TFR of a population,
one needs a representative sample of reproductive-aged women in the year of interest.
MEASURE DHS has collected fertility information on representative samples of Ghanaian
women aged 15 to 49 in 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. These data are repeated cross-
sections, but collection of retrospective birth histories allows for the creation of a woman-by
year panel, similar to that described in section 6. This allows for a reasonable calculation of
the TFR for women aged 15 to 45 in Ghana for the years 1984 to 2007.30 Note that, while
the fertility histories of respondents stretch back to 1951, the first year in which the sample
is representative of women aged 15 to 45 is 1984.31
A longer panel of fertility rate history can be achieved by focusing on age-specific fertility
rates. Given the focus in section 6 on women aged 17 to 25, I also calculate the ASFR for
this age group. The 17 to 25 ASFR for a given year is the number of children a woman would
have while she was aged 17 to 25 if she experienced the relevant single-age ASFRs for the
given year at each of those nine ages in her life. This can be calculated from 1965 to 2007,
as women in this age range in 1965 would be fully represented in the 1988 survey (as women
aged 41 to 49). I calculate the 17 to 25 ASFR separately for each of the eight demographic
subgroups created by pairwise combinations of poverty and education status for both rural
and urban sectors.32
For all women, there is a clear declining secular trend in fertility from 1965 to 2007 (see
Appendix Table A.7). Therefore, an estimation of the impact of the policy on fertility rates
must carefully account for this, including as many years as possible. Focusing on the 17 to
29Assuming no mortality of reproductive-age females.
30Only survey years are representative of women up to age 49; the interim years are only consistently
representative up to age 45. For example, any woman aged 46 or older in 1994 would not be enumerated in
1998, as she would be over 49 at that time. As the births for 1994 are drawn from surveys in 1998 or later,
these women’s births in 1994 would be excluded.
31This is because women aged 45 in 1983, for example, or at younger ages in earlier years, were not included
in any surveys as they were past the target age by 1988.
32Appendix Table A.7 summarizes the fertility trends in Ghana by rural and urban sectors (since 1989)
and by education level within the rural sector for the 17 to 25 ASFR (since 1970).
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25 ASFR for demographic sub-groups, I estimate
ASFRyg = δ0 + δ1ONy + Y
′
yθ + εyg (4)
where ASFRyg is the year- and group-specific ASFR for the 17 to 25 year old age range. The
estimation includes ASFR for eight groups across 43 years, for a total of 344 observations;
estimations are weighted according to the size of each sub-group. ONy is interacted with
indicators for urban, non-poor and high education statues in successive estimations. δ1
estimates the impact of the presence of the policy on the 17 to 25 ASFR; summations of
δ1 with coefficients from successive interaction terms provide estimates of this impact for
specific sub-groups. Y represents a quadratic time trend, and ε is a normally distributed
error.
Table 12 shows the results of estimations of variations of Eq. 4. Column 1 shows a
positive effect for the full population that is not distinguishable from zero. In Col. 2, we see
that the impact on rural fertility is positive and significant, and the impact on urban fertility
is negative but insignificant. Col. 3 suggests that the only positive and significant effect is
for poor rural women. Col. 4 confirms this, additionally showing that education status does
not change the impact among poor, rural women. The estimated effect for each of the eight
sub-groups is calculated via summation of the relevant coefficients and presented in Table
13. No significant changes were found among urban women. Positive impacts are estimated
for all rural women, but only for poor women are these distinguishable from zero.
For the less poor rural women, estimated increases are 3-6%, which are consistent with a
10% increase in conception, where 3 to 4 percentage points are offset with induced abortion.
However, given the standard errors, we cannot reject that these effects are zero.33 For the
poorest rural women, fertility increased by 7.4% for the uneducated and by 10.7% for the
educated, net of the secular trend. For the uneducated women, this is broadly consistent with
33Large standard errors likely result from noise, as some annual ASFRs are estimated based on as few
as 166 women per year of age. In order to calculate a fertility rate, one needs an accurate estimate of the
percent of women giving birth in each 1-year age group.
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the 10% observed increase in conception, with little-to-no offsetting with induced abortion.
As before, the small group of educated poor women present a puzzle: point estimates for
both conception and abortion are negative and insignificant, but estimates show an increase
in fertility. However, for 92% of the rural population, the findings are both consistent with
the conceptual framework proposed and consistent across estimation of different outcomes,
even using different data sources.
8 Conclusion
This study has examined Ghanaian women’s response to a reduction in the availability
of modern contraceptives in terms of resulting pregnancies, use of induced abortion, and
resulting births. The exogenous change in availability results from a U.S. policy, driven
entirely by domestic politics, that cut funding to NGOs providing reproductive health services
in poor countries. These organizations report that the primary change in service provision
resulting from the funding cuts was a reduction in contraceptive supplies and outreach in
rural areas. These claims are supported by method availability data from clinic surveys, and
lower-bound estimations of changes in contraceptive use during policy periods. I find that
provision of contraceptives in rural areas fell by 22% during policy periods.
Using reproductive histories that are unusually detailed for a poor-country setting, I
find that the vast majority of rural women were either unwilling or unable to fully offset
the reduction in modern contraception with traditional methods for preventing pregnancy.
These women experienced increases in pregnancies of 10%.
I also examine an additional potentially mediating behavior, that is, whether induced
abortion is used to offset increases in unplanned pregnancies. As predicted by the conceptual
framework, the poorest women did not increase abortion use. However, women in the upper
three wealth quintiles aborted 4 out of every 10 additional pregnancies that resulted from
the supply reduction. This compensating behavior did not differ according to educational
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attainment.
Given that the increase in pregnancy was only partially offset by abortion for some
women, and not at all for others, we would expect to see fertility rates increase in response
to the supply reductions as well. Using separate data to calculate age-specific fertility rates,
I find increases in fertility that are remarkably consistent with the estimates of impact on
conception and abortion. The poorest women realize fertility that is 7-10% higher than
predicted by the secular trend. The less-poor women experienced increases of 3-6%, though
these estimates are not as precise. Taken together, these changes in fertility are consistent
with previous estimates of the impact of contraceptive availability on fertility outcomes.
Molyneaux and Gertler (2000) estimate that, after controlling for changes in demand for
contraception, variation in family planning availability explained between 4 and 8% of fertility
decline in Indonesia from 1982 to 1987. Pritchett (1994) estimates that differences in family
planning efforts explain about 5% of differences in fertility across countries.
The pattern of differential impacts by demographic group provides some interesting in-
sights. It seems the increase in the price of contraceptives acted as a barrier not only for
the poorest women, but for less-poor women as well, as there is no difference in conception
impacts by wealth for uneducated women. Given this dominance of the monetary price
effect, I cannot identify whether increased time costs required for accessing contraceptives
were a significant barrier or not. Further, it seems that education alone does not mean a
woman will be successful at preventing pregnancy with traditional methods, as there is no
difference in conception impacts by education for non-poor women. However, educated poor
women were able to avoid increases in pregnancy, suggesting that a combination of education
and experience may improve effectiveness of traditional methods. Finally, the assumption
that uneducated women hold traditional values, preventing them from increasing abortion
in response to the supply change does not hold; among non-poor women, the uneducated
were no less likely to compensate for the supply reduction by increasing abortion use.
The supply of contraceptives in many African countries is heavily depending on donor
32
funding. As shown here, such funds are subject to the whims of donors, and may change
unpredictably. While some researchers have argued that contraceptive availability is not a
significant factor in fertility outcomes, the results of this study suggest otherwise. In the face
of supply reductions, nearly all rural women experienced increased pregnancy. Among those
that could afford to respond by increasing their use of induced abortion, even those with
ex-ante low use rates chose to do so. Increases in realized fertility, relative to the secular
trend, arguably represent increases in unwanted or unplanned births. While a 5-10% increase
in total fertility may seem negligibly small as some have claimed, in fact, this represents a
significant 20-40% increase in unwanted fertility.
The burden of these additional unwanted births fell disproportionately on the poorest
women. These are significant impacts of a supply reduction that may have long-term im-
plications. Increasing the use of induced abortion puts women at greater risk of unsafe
procedures and long-lasting complications, in a setting that already has the highest ma-
ternal mortality in the world. And adding additional unplanned births in poor households
strains their ability to raise a healthy and productive next generation.
In Africa, total fertility is higher than anywhere else in the world, and 25% of births are
unwanted. International funding for contraceptive supplies clearly has role in changing these
statistics, and may have distributional impacts as well. However, the reproductive health
sectors in poor countries must eventually develop donor independence to ensure reliability
of provision in the longer run. The results presented here suggest that interruptions or
reductions in supply can hinder the demographic transition of Africa and result in a poorer,
less healthy and less productive population in the future.
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Tables & Figures
Table 1: Predicted Impact of Contraceptive Supply Reduction by demographic group
Low Education High Education
Poor conception: increase conception: ambiguous
abortion: no change abortion: no change
fertility: increase fertility: increases iff conception increases
Non-Poor conception: no change conception: ambiguous
abortion: no change abortion: increase iff conception increases
fertility: no change fertility: no change
39
Table 2: Family Planning Commodity Availability (as percent of clinics)
1993 1996 2002
(MCP1) (NoMCP) (MCP2)
Combined Pill 92% 92% 82% **
Progesterone Pill 62% 86% ** 75% **
Condom 85% 93% ** 87% **
Injectable 94% 90% * 93%
Spermicide 85% 91% * 74% **
IUD 89% 89% 76% **
Implant 0% 85% ** 74%**
N 399 313 428
Note: *Indicates that the measure is significantly different from the measure in the previous survey at the
5% level (** 1%). Source: Hong et al. (2005)
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Table 5: Summary of Contraceptive Use, Conception and Abortion
Ages 17 - 25
Ever Used Rate of Aborted share of
N Contraceptives Conception Pregnancies
All 10,370 52% 2.2% 8.6%
Urban 4,960 59% 1.8% 15.3%
Rural 5,410 47% 2.5% 4.8%
Rural Sub-groups
Poorest Low Education 1,676 28% 2.7% 1.6%
Poorest Hi Education 490 55% 2.5% 7.0%
Less Poor Low Education 1,595 46% 2.7% 3.7%
Less Poor Hi Education 1,649 62% 2.2% 9.7%
Note: Data are from special DHS 2007. Rates of conception and abortion are for months when women are
aged 17 - 25. Rate of conception is the probability of conception in a single month. “Less Poor” is the top 3
wealth quintiles in the rural population; note that 70% of this group is poor by the international standard
of $2/day. “Low Education” indicates those with no education beyond primary school (grade 6). Sampling
weights are employed.
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Table 6: Policy’s Effect on Probability of Conception per Month
Rural Subgroups
All Urban Rural Poorest Less Poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy .0011** -.0003 .0022*** .0019* .0024** .0021** .0020*
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Policy*Schooling -.0032* .0003
(.002) (.001)
Linear Combination -.0007 .0023**
(.0020) (.0012)
N 686449 322506 363943 147832 147832 216111 216111
R2 .007 .007 .008 .010 .010 .008 .008
Mean of Dep.Var .0195 .0164 .0217 .0228 .0228 .0210 .0210
Effective Increase in
Pregnancy (main effect) 5.6% .. 10.1% 8.3% 10.5% 10% 9.5%
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for conceiving in a given month. Data are from special DHS
2007. Samples include all months in which a woman was aged 17-25. All specifications include woman-fixed
effects, woman level controls as described in the text, a cubic time trend, calendar month fixed effects, and
indicators for which policy change is relevant. “Poorest” indicates the lowest two wealth quintiles of the rural
sample. “Less Poor” is the top three quintiles in the rural sample. “Schooling” indicates having education
beyond primary school (grade 6). Sampling weights are employed. Standard errors are shown in parentheses,
clustered at the village level. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%.
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Table 7: Policy’s Effect on Share of Pregnancies ending by Abortion
Rural Subgroups
All Urban Rural Poorest LessPoor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy .0144+ .0044 .0235** -.0019 .0059 .0393*** .0443***
(.009) (.020) (.009) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
Policy*Schooling -.0470 -.0135
(.037) (.019)
Linear Combination -.0411 .0308
.0369 .0195
N 12439 4945 7494 3155 3155 4339 4339
R2 .132 .239 .074 .067 .070 .090 .091
Mean of Dep.Var .0823 .1484 .0457 .0263 .0263 .0585 .0585
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a pregnancy conclusion was an abortion. Data
are from special DHS 2007. Samples include all pregnancy conclusions for women aged 17 to 25. All
specifications include woman-fixed effects, woman level controls as described in the text, a cubic time trend,
calendar month fixed effects, and indicators for which policy change is relevant. For descriptions of sub-
groups by schooling and wealth, see notes to Table 6. Sampling weights are employed. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; **
5%; * 10%.
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Table 8: Summary of Impacts on Conception and Abortion
Low Education High Education
Poorest [population share: 33%] [population share: 8%]
Conception: 10.5% increase Conception: c/n reject no change
Abortion: c/n reject no change Abortion: c/n reject no change
Less Poor [population share: 29%] [population share: 30%]
Conception: 9.5% increase Conception: 11% increase
Abortion: increased; Abortion: increased;
offset 4 of 10 add’l pregnancies offset 3 of 10 add’l pregnancies
Note: For descriptions of sub-groups by schooling and wealth, see notes to Table 6.
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Table 9: Narrowing the Window Around Policy Changes
Conception Abortion
42mos 36mos 30mos 24mos 42mos 36mos 30mos 24mos
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Policy .0016** .0018** .0026*** .0025** .0399*** .0479** .0634*** .0728**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.014) (.019) (.024) (.036)
N 322152 277406 232915 187891 3826 3334 2820 2252
R2 .008 .008 .008 .008 .087 .095 .094 .114
Note: Dependent variables are shown as multi-column headers. Data are from special DHS 2007. Samples
for columns 1 - 4 include months when a rural woman is 17 to 25 year old, which are within the specified
number of months from a policy change. Samples for columns 5 - 8 include pregnancy conclusions within
the specified number of months of a policy change for rural women aged 17 to 25 who are not in the poorest
two quintiles. All specifications include woman-fixed effects, woman level controls as described in the text, a
cubic time trend, calendar month fixed effects, and indicators for which policy change is relevant. Sampling
weights are employed. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** indicates
statistical significance at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%.
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Table 10: Robustness & Placebo Checks
Controlling Excluding Ages Ages No No Placebo
CONCEPTION for NHIS 2001 change 16-26 15-27 Weights Controls Election
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Policy .0023*** .0029*** .0014** .0019** .0020*** .0015**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Placebo Policy -.0020
(.002)
N 363943 217817 441720 285348 363943 363943 111031
R2 .008 .008 .008 .009 .008 .000 .008
Controlling Excluding Ages Ages No No Placebo
ABORTION for NHIS 2001 change 16-26 15-27 Weights Controls Election
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Policy .0399*** .0525*** .0289** .0342** .0377*** .0405***
(.014) (.016) (.013) (.015) (.012) (.013)
Placebo Policy .0277
(.035)
N 4339 2643 5021 3515 4339 4339 1413
R2 .090 .092 .083 .107 .085 .014 .128
Note: Dependent variables are shown as left-hand table headers. Data are from special DHS 2007. Upper
Panel: Samples include rural women in months when aged 17 to 25. Lower Panel: Samples include
pregnancy conclusions for rural women in the upper three rural wealth quintiles, aged 17 to 25. Both
Panels: The final column includes observations 4 years before or after a placebo policy change (to OFF)
in 1988, coinciding with a U.S. presidential election. All specifications include woman-fixed effects, calendar
month fixed effects, indicators for which policy change is relevant, a cubic time trend, and woman-month
level controls, except as noted. Sampling weights are employed, except as noted. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** 5%; *
10%.
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Table 11: Impact of policy on conception and abortion, by regional impact of policy on use
of modern contraception
Conceive Conceive Abort Abort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy .0022*** .0031*** .0393*** .0474**
(.00064) (.00106) (.01291) (.01973)
Policy*Medium Impact Region -.0004 -.0071
(.00145) (.02224)
Policy*Low Impact Region -.0021 -.0184
(.00125) (.02001)
Lin. Combination for Med .0028** .0403**
(.00106) (.01775)
Lin. Combination for Low .0011 .0290**
(.00090) (.01361)
Observations 363943 363943 4339 4339
R2 .008 .008 .090 .091
Mean of Dep. Var .0217 .0585
Notes: Dependent variables are shown as column headers. Data are from special DHS 2007. Indicators
of policy impacts are those estimated in Table 11. Cols 1 and 2 use rural woman-months; cols 3 and 4
use pregnancy conclusions of rural, less poor women. All columns include woman fixed effects, quadratic
functions of age and parity, an indicator for ever married, a cubic time trend, calendar month fixed effects,
and policy change fixed effects. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the village level. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%.
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Table 12: Policy Impact on Fertility Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy .0487 .1202* .1715* .1644*
(.043) (.061) (.089) (.094)
Policy*Urban -.1921** -.1916** -.2038**
(.084) (.084) (.082)
Policy*Non Poor -.0937 -.1024
(.091) (.091)
Policy*Primary Ed .0397
(.080)
Linear Combination: Urban -.0719 -.0201 See Table 13
.0588 .0765
Linear Combination: Nonpoor .0778 See Table 13
.0660
N 344 344 344 344
R2 .607 .614 .615 .616
Note: Dependent variable is the age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) for 17 to 25 year olds in years 1965 to
2007, calculated separately for eight demographic groups (by rural/urban, poor/non-poor, and low/high
education). Data are from standard DHS cross-sectional surveys in 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. For
descriptions of sub-groups by schooling and wealth, see notes to Table 6. Estimations are weighted by the
size of the demographic group; sizes given in Table 13. All linear combinations from Col 4 are shown in
Table 13. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *** Indicates significance at 1% level; ** 5% level; *
10% level.
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Table 13: Summary of Impacts on Fertility Rates
No/Low Education High Education
Rural Poorest Effect .1644* Effect 0.2041**
(.094) (.094)
ASFR: 2.23 ASFR: 1.9
% effect: 7.4% % effect: 10.7%
Pop share: 23% Pop share: 5%
Rural Less Poor Effect 0.0620 Effect 0.1018
(.080) (.071)
ASFR: 2.19 ASFR: 1.71
% effect: 2.8% % effect: 6.0%
Pop share: 21% Pop share: 14%
Urban Poor Effect -0.0393 Effect 0.0004
(.089) (.090)
ASFR: 1.99 ASFR: 1.43
Pop share: 8% Pop share: 8%
Urban Non Poor Effect -0.1417 Effect -0.1020
(.077) (.077)
ASFR: 1.69 ASFR: 1.08
Pop share: 6% Pop share: 14%
Note: Data are from standard DHS cross-sectional surveys in 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. Estimated
effects shown are linear combinations from Col 4 of Table 12. For descriptions of sub-groups by schooling
and wealth, see notes to Table 6. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *** Indicates significance at 1%
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Figure 2: Conception & Abortion Statistics
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Appendix
Table A.1: USAID Funds Slated to Foreign Reproductive Health NGOs for FY2001
Country Total Funds Organizations
Nicaragua $ 5,916,406 APROFAM
Guatemala $ 3,427,370 APROFAM
Peru $ 2,006,509 APROFAM, PUNO, PROFAMILIA
Kenya $ 1,852,803 Family Planning Association of Kenya
Ghana $ 797,014 Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana, GSMF
Philippines $ 686,498 Friendlycare Foundation
Paraguay $ 581,057 Centro Paraguayo de Estudios de Poblacion
Dominican Republic $ 318,871 Asociacion Dominicana de Planificacion familiar
Romania $ 192,161 FTPT, Society for Contraceptive & Sexuality Education
Senegal $ 31,915 SANFAM
Median $ 741,756
Source: USAID (1999). Note: Funds are aggregated by country, in some cases slated to multiple NGOs, as
shown. Figures were published in 1999, before the re-imposition of the policy in early 2001. In some cases,
multi-year grants have been divided to represent funds specific to 2001.
Acronyms for Tables A.1 and A.2:
APROFAM: Asociacion Pro-Bienestar de la Familia
FAA: Foreign Aid Appropriations
FOA: Foreign Operations Appropriations
FRA: Foreign Relations Authorization PSI
FTPT: Fundatia Tineri Pentru Tineri GSMF
GSMF: Ghana Social Marketing Foundation
IPPF: International Planned Parenthood Federation
PPFA: Planned Parenthood Federation of America
PROFAMILIA: Programa de planificacion familiar y salud materno infantil del cusco
PUNO: Planification Familiar
SANFAM: Sante de la Famille
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
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Table A.3: IPPF Funding to Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana
Allocation Year Funding from IPPF As percent of funding in 2000
2000 $1,694,592
2001 $926,706 55%
2002 $780,000 46%
2003 $902,851 53%
2004 $1,199,589 71%
2005 $1,114,402 66%
2006 $1,125,598 66%
2007 $1,148,371 68%
2008 $1,270,742 75%
Source: IPPF financial statements 2001-2009
Table A.4: Mean Age of Sample, by period
Period Years Full Sample 17 - 25 yos 18 - 20 yos
PRE 1981-1984 18.3 19.7 18.9
ON 1 1985-1992 21.9 20.7 19.0
OFF 1993-2000 25.1 20.8 19.0
ON 2 2000-2007 28.2 20.9 19.0
Note: Data are from 2007 special DHS. The time periods are restricted to match the 8-year time windows
surrounding the policy changes, as in the analysis.
Table A.5: Effective Sample Size for Analysis of Abortion Use
At any time While aged 17-25
Women in sample 9,094 {8,334}
Had any pregnancy 6,470 {5,860}
Had 2+ pregnancies 5,273 3,889
Has variation in policy across pregnancies 4,477 2,286
Note: Data are from 2007 special DHS. Samples includes women aged 15 to 49 between 1981 and 2004.
57
Table A.6: Policy’s Effect on Unconditional Probability of Abortion
All Poorest Less Poor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy .0003 .0001 .0003 .0004 .0005*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Policy*Schooling -.0010 -.0003
(.001) (.000)
p-value (main) 0.117 0.664 0.266 0.141 0.059
Linear Combination -.0007 .0002
SE (.0007) (.0004)
N 363943 147832 147832 216111 216111
R2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Mean of Dep.Var .0009 .0006 .0006 .0012 .0012
Note: Dependent variable is whether woman i had an abortion in the given month, irrespective of pregnancy
status. Data are from special DHS 2007. Samples are denoted in column headers and include all months
in which a women was aged 17 to 25. All specifications include woman-fixed effects, woman level controls
as described in the text, a cubic time trend, calendar month fixed effects, and indicators for which policy
change is relevant. For descriptions of sub-groups by schooling and wealth, see notes to Table 6. Sampling
weights are employed. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered at the cluster level. *** Indicates
significance at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table A.7: Historical Fertility Rates in Ghana
TFR 17 to 25 ASFR (Rural)
Year Urban Rural Low Education High Education
1970 2.4 2.7
1975 2.1 2.3
1980 2.1 2.2
1985 2.2 2.1
1990 4.6 6.6 2.4 1.8
1995 3.4 6.1 2.2 1.7
2000 3.4 6.5 2.4 1.8
2005 3.0 4.7 1.8 1.4
Note: Data are from standard DHS cross-sectional surveys in 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. TFR is total
fertility rate in births per woman over her lifetime; 17 to 25 ASFR is age-specific fertility rate – births per
woman while she is between the ages of 17 and 25. Accurate TFR cannot be calculated prior to 1989 based
on these data.
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